

Approved For Release 2007/02/08

CIA-RDP79T00975A030700010112-6

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE

Tuesday 18 July 1978

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National Intelligence Daily Cable for Tuesday, 18 July 1978.

The NID Cable is for the purpose of informing senior US officials.

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USSR: Kulakov Death Leaves Void

25X1 [] *The death yesterday of Fedor Kulakov leaves a void in the Soviet leadership that could have an unsettling effect on succession politics in the Soviet Union.*

25X1 [] Kulakov, who was 60 last February, occupied a position in the leadership that marked him as one of the possible successors to General Secretary Brezhnev. He was certainly the most advantageously placed among members of his generation. He was one of the four Kremlin leaders who were both members of the policymaking Politburo and the party secretariat that executes that policy. The other three--Brezhnev, Suslov, and Kirilenko--are all in their 70s and except for Kirilenko are not in the best health.

25X1 [] For more than a decade Kulakov's principal responsibility was the supervision of agricultural affairs. His lack of experience in other fields was a liability and during the past year he had evidently attempted to create an image of broader competence.

25X1 [] Kulakov's obvious ambitions to play a prominent role in the succession may have become a matter of increasing controversy. In recent months he had received a number of protocol slights, but he seemed to be participating at his normal level during the Supreme Soviet session earlier this month.

25X1 [] Kulakov's death creates a vacuum in the leadership that will be more important than the role of agricultural monitor he played in the secretariat. The question of whether to name another secretary with Politburo rank, particularly one from Kulakov's relatively young generation, is far more sensitive and controversial because it inevitably bears on the succession question.

25X1 [] Kulakov was a prime contender in his generation for the top party post largely by default. His credentials were far less impressive than those of the other potential candidates, but he was in much the best spot--in Moscow. Politburo members Shcherbitskiy from the Ukraine and Romanov from Leningrad, for example, are both strong contenders for Brezhnev's mantle. Not having a job in Moscow has limited their chances, but appointment to the secretariat would correct this deficiency and also place them in the ruling circle on a day-to-day basis.

[redacted] The seniors thus far have determinedly avoided such steps. The question remains whether they can or will wish to continue to delay moves that would work to the advantage of one or another of the "next" generation. If delay on succession is again in the cards, Kulakov's responsibilities could be divided between a party elder and a fresh but nonthreatening official from the provinces. Brezhnev could impose such a solution without much difficulty, but in the longer run it could lead to resentment in the next generation. [redacted]

ZAMBIA-RHODESIA: Cuban Policy

[redacted] the *Zambian Government has decided to impose stricter controls on Cuban military personnel entering or transiting the country. The action was prompted by a number of incidents involving Cubans and the Zambian-based Zimbabwe African People's Union over the past several months.*

[redacted] //ZAPU, following Cuban advice, has not respected the guidelines set down by the Zambian Government almost a year ago to limit the number of Cubans training ZAPU guerrillas in Zambia. Although the guidelines set no specific quotas, Zambian President Kaunda directed that only Cubans with special skills needed by ZAPU would be allowed to enter Zambia, and then only on a temporary basis.

[redacted] //In mid-March a convoy carrying supplies, trained guerrillas, and 240 Cubans from Angola entered Zambia without prior approval from the Zambian Government. The convoy was turned back by the Zambian Army. In late April or May, Kaunda decided to prohibit flights carrying "large" numbers of Cubans between Angola and Mozambique from flying over or landing in Zambia.

[redacted] In theory, the entry of Cuban--and Soviet--personnel to assist ZAPU is determined on a case-by-case basis following a formal request from ZAPU. Although Kaunda does not want to prevent ZAPU from getting the assistance it needs, he remains determined to prevent a major influx of Cubans into his country. Some 50 to 70 Cubans are now working with ZAPU in Zambia.

ZAIRE-ANGOLA: Relations

25X1 [redacted] //Delegations from Zaire and Angola that met in Brazzaville last weekend to normalize relations and lessen tensions apparently reached initial agreement on several issues.//

[redacted] 25X1 the delegations--meeting under Congolese auspices--agreed:

- To repatriate refugees who wish to return to their respective countries.
- To institute controls to ensure that refugees are disarmed.
- To establish a demilitarized zone on both sides of the Zairian-Angolan border.
- To create a multilateral African observer team, approved by the OAU, to monitor the demilitarized zone.//

(S NF NC OC) //The delegations also agreed to reopen the Benguela Railroad, but because of the unstable security situation along major parts of the railroad, the Zairians are unlikely to export large quantities of goods over this route for some time. [redacted]

25X1 [redacted] 25X1 [redacted] In the meantime, the Angolans have asked the Zairian military to identify the locations of Angolan insurgent military camps alleged to exist in Zaire.//

25X1 [redacted] //The Zairian Ambassador in Brazzaville told the US Charge that Zaire would be looking to the US for logistic support--including aircraft--to assist the multilateral African observer team.//

25X1 [redacted] //There are a number of contentious issues, such as the aid both countries provide to the other's dissidents, that remain to be resolved before relations can be normalized; the establishment of diplomatic relations apparently was not discussed. [redacted] 25X1

ECUADOR: First Round Elections


25X1 [] An impressive plurality won by populist candidate Jaime Roldos in the first round of Ecuador's presidential election on Sunday poses a major dilemma for the country's military rulers. Government leaders gave repeated assurances before the election that they would respect the results. Some of them are worried, however, that a Roldos administration might be unduly influenced by their major political antagonist, disqualified presidential candidate Assad Bucaram, who heads the party that nominated Roldos. This fear could lead to further government manipulation of the election, or, if Roldos wins the presidency in the runoff in September, another coup d'etat.

25X1 [] According to unofficial returns, Roldos received over 30 percent of the 1.8 million votes cast, compared to 23 percent for his nearest rival, Sixto Duran-Ballen, the candidate of a center-right coalition. Roldos' upset victory came despite a series of surreptitious moves by the government to scuttle the campaign waged by his party, the Concentration of Popular Forces.

25X1 [] In addition to its disqualification last February of Bucaram, who was the party's original nominee and the election frontrunner, the government attempted to disqualify Roldos' running mate, Osvaldo Hurtado. It also secured the removal of Bucaram and his wife from the mayoralty slate in Guayaquil in a transparent effort to weaken the party's powerful electoral base in Ecuador's coastal region.

25X1 [] Military leaders opposed to Roldos are apprehensive that under the influence of Bucaram--who is also Roldos' father-in-law--he might take punitive action against officers who have enriched themselves at public expense during the past six years of military rule. During the closing days of the campaign Roldos tried to convince the military that they have nothing to fear if he is elected. Yesterday, however, he made a victory statement that promised "social changes and fundamental reforms."

25X1 [] In his statement Roldos also said that if successful in the runoff he would "forge the moral restoration of the country." This is the kind of populist rhetoric that drove the military to cancel the last presidential election in 1972, when it appeared that Bucaram would be victorious.



CHAD: Military Situation

[Redacted] //French officials in Chad consider the military situation stable for the time being. Rebel activity is low and the initiative has passed to French and Chadian forces. The Chadian Government still faces serious economic and political problems that threaten its survival.//

[Redacted] //The French believe the Libyan-backed Toubou rebels are reorganizing and refitting after having suffered about 1,000 casualties during the past year. The insurgents are also having problems finding qualified technicians and staff personnel to help build a force that could stand up to the French.//

[Redacted] According to the French Ambassador in Ndjamena, French reconnaissance aircraft have detected no recent enemy troop movements of any significance, and ground patrols are now operating freely as far as 200 kilometers north of the Abeche-Ati-Moussoro defensive line.

[Redacted] //The Chadian Army is recovering from its own setbacks; it lost about half its strength during the fighting of the past year. The government is having greater success in recruiting new personnel and the fighting spirit of the troops has been bolstered by French support and by recent victories, according to the French Ambassador.//

[Redacted] //Chadian President Malloum apparently is continuing to make public appearances in government-controlled regions of the country. The French report that the local populace has become more cooperative and that the morale of local officials is

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improving. France still intends to maintain pressure on Malloum to replace Chad's ruling Supreme Military Council with a government of national reconciliation, including at least some minor rebel groups.//

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[] //The Malloum regime is widely discredited as a result of its inability to deal with military and economic problems. The US Embassy reports that it is doubtful any new government will be able to resolve the country's underlying problems, which will continue to be manifested through protest or rebellion.//

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[] //Libyan Prime Minister Jallud discussed the Chad issue with French President Giscard in Paris last week, but apparently there was no forward movement. French African affairs adviser Rene Journiac observed that Libya does not seem serious about reaching an agreement. For its part, France plans to continue supporting the Chadian Government position that withdrawal of French troops from Chad should not be the first step of any compromise with the rebels.// []

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ZAMBIA: Problems with ZAPU

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[] //The recent Rhodesian operations against guerrilla bases of the Zimbabwe African People's Union in the Choma area of Zambia have ended, [] Zambia's refusal to help ZAPU counter the Rhodesian attacks is reported to have aggravated longstanding differences between them. Soviet and Cuban advisers may have suggested that ZAPU try to circumvent the Zambians.//

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[] //Fighting in southern Zambia ended last Tuesday, and all Rhodesian forces--except possibly a few small reconnaissance teams--apparently have returned to Rhodesia. Zambian forces put up little resistance while retreating to Choma and left ZAPU to face the Rhodesians alone.//

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[] //Zambia's reluctance to fight and its unwillingness last week to supply trucks to move guerrilla reinforcements to the Rhodesian border have aggravated frictions with ZAPU. After Lusaka refused to supply the trucks, the Soviets and Cubans arranged for Angolan aircraft to transport ZAPU personnel from Angola to Lusaka without Zambia's permission.//

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
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[REDACTED] //ZAPU's Soviet and Cuban advisers are reported to have recommended that the guerrillas circumvent the Zambians whenever possible. They have suggested that ZAPU inform the government about guerrilla activities only after they have begun, and that it tell the Zambians that weapons drawn from Zambian-controlled stockpiles would be used for training, when actually they would be sent to the border camps. [REDACTED]

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BRIEF

Worldwide Terrorism

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[REDACTED] //Yesterday's surprise agreement by the seven world leaders at the Bonn summit to a strong antihijacking measure could mark a turning point in multilateral cooperation against terrorism. The seven, at least in principle, agreed to cut off airline services to and from countries that refuse to extradite or prosecute hijackers or fail to return hijacked airplanes. Other states have been invited to join in this "common undertaking against international terrorism."//

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
[REDACTED] //Numerous practical and legal problems remain. In addition, some radical Third World regimes are likely to withhold cooperation in view of their sympathy for "national liberation movements." While Soviet and East European nations have signaled some willingness to cooperate with the West Europeans in dealing with terrorists, as witnessed by Bulgaria's aid to the West Germans last month in apprehending four West German anarchists on Bulgarian soil, it is not clear that they would subscribe to this specific agreement. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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